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Margaret Chon*
New Wine Bursting From Old
Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art,
Joint Works, and
Entrepreneurship
N a New Yorker cartoon somewhat less famous than the one
captioned "On the Internet, no one knows you're a dog,"
three men are standing at the end of a very long pipe. Instead of
being circular, it is C-shaped. One of the men says, "I'm afraid,
Inspector, this means that everybody and everything in the coun-
try has been copyrighted." (on file with author)
If the Information Infrastructure Task Force recommendations
are adopted by Congress,1 copyright law will over-privatize digi-
tal works at the expense of access by individuals to our cultural
information commons.' Nonetheless, I want to suggest and ex-
plore here a converse proposition: as the old "bottle" of print-
based copyright law expands to cover new media and new uses,
the transformative possibilities of these new uses in new media
* Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. Thanks to Professor
Bonnie Mitchell of the Syracuse University College of Visual and Performing Arts,
whose Internet art projects triggered these thoughts, and to Professor Keith Aoki,
whose tireless energy encouraged the translation of these thoughts into fixed form. I
gratefully acknowledge the research support provided by my research assistants
Rika Suzuki and Scott Mulligan. I also thank Dean Charles R. O'Kelley of the
University of Oregon Law School for hosting the Innovation and Information Envi-
ronment Conference, and Dean Daan Braveman of Syracuse College of Law for
research support as well as for the New Yorker cartoon. I dedicate this to my father,
Wan Yong Chon, who refuses to bifurcate art from science.
1 INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, App. 1 (September 1995) [hereinaf-
ter White Paper]; H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996).
2 ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRIVACY TO PUB-
LIC ACCESS (1994); Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV.
(1995); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L.
REv. (1995); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 135.
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will occasionally pop the cork of existing legal categories. Typi-
cal authorship practices in networked computer environments re-
sult in works that disrupt the distinction between author and
infringer and that create a type of access to works (the access of a
joint author to a joint work) that is underdeveloped in current
copyright doctrine.3
In Part I, I review the two major print-based principles of
American copyright law: "work" and "author." The dual effects
of digitization and networking of computers have exposed the
limits of these two principles. I buttress doctrinal observations
with some theoretical background: copyright theory influenced
by the post-structuralist turn has already forecast the indetermi-
nacy of the text (work) and the death of the subject (author), at
least where the latter is based on the ideal type of a solitary ge-
nius and the former on the static, reified end-result of the genius'
efforts. In Part II, I focus on a specific example of collaboration
in a particular superset of networked environments: a work of
visual art created on the Internet. I discuss how this project
would be treated under recent judicial glosses on the doctrinal
category of "joint work"; describe the awkwardness of shoehorn-
ing the project into this doctrinal category; and thus highlight the
need for copyright principles that recognize and encourage the
unique attributes of creativity within a digital networked com-
puter environment. I also show how copyright theory points to a
way out of the doctrinal "problem" created by collaborative
work on the Internet. Finally, in Part III, I muse on the implica-
tions of an expanded "joint work" category on entrepreneurship
in a digital networked environment.
3 Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Crea-
tivity, 10 CARDozo ARTS & ENrr. L.J. 293 (1992).
Although copyright law has a category for works created by several writers
working together on a preconcerted basis, the consequences that flow from
the categorization of a work as one of "joint authorship" reflect the indi-
vidualistic bias of American copyright doctrine.... Far from acknowledg-
ing the extent to which participation in a corporate, creative enterprise
entails the surrender of individual prerogative, copyright law implicitly as-
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I
FROM PRINT-BASED TO DIGITAL NETWORKED-
BASED COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES
In this section I examine two of the more important principles
underlying a print-based copyright regime: the "work" principle
and the "author" principle. The common theme in this abbrevi-
ated survey is that digital works, particularly networked digital
works, have fundamentally and repeatedly stretched these princi-
ples, perhaps beyond the point of usefulness. Moreover, literary
theory imported into copyright theory has already corroded
these principles as applied to print-based media.
A. The "Work" Principle
Even as the 1976 Copyright Act was being enacted into law,
basic statutory terms were contested. The 1976 Copyright Act
defined the protectible subject matter of copyright ("works of au-
thorship")4 as having to be "fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression"; 5 yet its drafters recognized that the concept of
"fixation" was already challenged by computer technology. 6 In
1974, after early hearings on what ultimately became the 1976
Copyright Act disclosed probable controversy over copyright
protection in computer technology, Congress created the Na-
tional Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works ("CONTU"). 7 The CONTU Report ultimately endorsed
the idea of copyrightability of computer programs and recom-
mended revisions to the 1976 Act to address explicitly computer
4 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
5 Id.
6 The legislative history of the 1976 Act states: "Section 102(b) is intended, among
other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the
copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5670.
7 CONTU was charged with making recommendations about "the reproduction
and use of copyrighted works of authorship (1) in automatic systems capable of stor-
ing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information, and (2) by various forms of
machine reproduction." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 4 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU Report].
This quaint enabling language resulted in a 154-page Final Report-colloquially
called the CONTU Report-which took three years to draft (compared to the NII
Working Group's one-and-a-half year sojourn on the 278-page White Paper, supra
note 1).
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programs.' The dissenting commissioners noted unique
problems caused by trying to impose the concept of fixation on a
non-human-readable literary work.9
A work can be "fixed" so long as it is "sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."'"
But with digital works, which are inherently transient and tempo-
rary, this definition of fixation may include fleetingly fixed works
within the subject matter of copyright and thus over-extend copy-
right to works that have no stable form.11 As others have al-
ready noted, only in the last three years have courts actually
extended the doctrinal category of "copies"" a with the fixation it
8 The question of whether fixed "copies" of computer programs could exist was
answered affirmatively, on the reasoning that computer programs could be stored
and therefore reproduced. Among other things, the CONTU Report suggested that
the placement of a copyrighted work into a computer-or, in the jargon of
the trade, the "inputting" of it-is the preparation of a copy. This may be
ascertained by reading together the definitions of copies and fixed found in
section 101 .... Because works in computer storage may be repeatedly
reproduced, they are fixed and, therefore, are copies.
CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 22.
9 A strong dissent by Commissioner Hersey argued that
[t]he mechanical phases of programs were now described as copies. On
several grounds this euphemism proves as unserviceable as the previous
ones.... [A] program, when keyed or run into a computer, is transformed
by a compiler program into a purely machine state. The term copy is
meaningless for the reason that in this transformation the means of expres-
sion of the original work become totally irrelevant. All that matters is the
program's functional use.
Id. at 32. This reasoning applies also to the question of whether intermediate digi-
tized versions of literary, visual, or auditory works can be considered copies of those
works as they are expressed in human-readable form.
10 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
11 Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L.J.
29, 41 (1994). A slew of computer copyright cases shows the difficulty of determin-
ing the proper subject matter of copyright even in software that is fixed for more
than a temporary period. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland, Int'l., Inc., 49 F.3d 807
(1st Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1995) (copyrightability of menu command hier-
archy); Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)
(copyrightability of program structure); Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (copyrightability of program structure); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (copyright-
ability of object code); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1989 WL 67434 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(copyrightability of microcode).
12 "'Copies' are material objects... in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
[Vol. 75, 19961
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requires13 to transient computer programs specifically designed
to be temporarily stored in random-access memory.
14
Networked computers pose additional challenges to the con-
cept of fixation, challenges which stem from the radical reorgani-
zation of time and space on the Internet, as well as its vastly
enhanced methods of dissemination. 5 Significantly, fixation no
longer serves as a proxy for possible use, but rather is highly dis-
connected from the actual use of a work. A digitized copy of a
computer program in the memory of a stand-alone computer is
unlikely to be there unless the computer owner has used, is using,
or is planning to use that copy. By contrast, the Internet is com-
posed of vast stores of digitized information, and any particular
use is severed from the fixation of digital information within a
specific computer's hard drive or memory.
Digitized information may be transferred from one networked
computer to another without ever being read or otherwise used
by the owner of any particular computer. If someone sends me
an e-mail message, for example, that is sufficiently "fixed" so that
I could reproduce it or re-transmit it, I may choose to delete it
without reading it. Yet, since it was transmitted to me, the per-
son who sent it made a copy on my network server computer's
hard drive. By deleting it, I may also be making a copy on the
server computer's hard drive, since a "delete" command typically
instructs the computer to place the message in a different file
rather than to expunge it entirely. If I choose to open the e-mail
but not read it, a copy may be made in my computer's memory
and not deleted until I "exit" my e-mail application and/or shut
my computer down.
Similarly, it is unlikely and perhaps even illegal for anyone
who operates the intermediate computers on which the original
post may have been stored on its way to my computer to read or
13 Id.
14 MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Triad
Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5390 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 18, 1994) aff'd, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); Advanced Computer Services of
Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994). Not only
are these decisions questionable from a copyright doctrinal perspective but they also
give the plaintiff a virtual monopoly on activities ancillary to the software product,
such as service and maintenance. This would be considered a form of "tying" in a
patent context, and thus raises significant antitrust concerns. See Advanced Com-
puter Services, 845 F. Supp. at 367-69.
15 M. Ethan Katsh, Cybertime, Cyberspace and Cyberlaw, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 1,
available online URL: httpJ/www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/.
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otherwise use that message. Thus that message will simply be
transmitted over that computer without being used. Yet that
message may reside on the transmitting machine's storage units
and thus may be sufficiently "fixed" to be a copy. Under the
White Paper's theory of infringement, even the passive act of
storage could cause the intermediate computer operator to be
liable for infringement. 16 In the recent order denying summary
judgment in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc., Judge Whyte recognized this diffi-
culty: "Plaintiffs point out that the infringing copies resided for
eleven days on Netcom's computer and were sent out from it
onto the 'Information Superhighway.' However, under plaintiffs'
theory, any storage of a copy that occurs in the process of send-
ing a message to the Usenet is an infringement.'
17
If in the networked environment all digitized information is
presumed capable of being "fixed," then any use of the work is
necessarily an infringement (assuming the originality require-
ment is met). 8 Ironically, however, there is a greater disjunc-
ture between fixation of copies and actual hands-on use in a
networked computer environment than in any other technologi-
cal environment to date. Moreover, the culture that has evolved
in the Internet is one in which information is highly promiscuous;
even one-to-one private e-mail messages are often redistributed
widely and publicly. 9 Treating each transmission and retrans-
mission of digitized information as "fixed" and therefore possibly
16 White Paper App. 1 at 2 ("Section 101 of the Title 17, United States Code, is
amended-in the definition of 'transmit' by inserting at the end thereof the follow-
ing: 'To transmit' a reproduction is to distribute it by any device or process whereby
a copy . . . of the work is fixed beyond the place from which it was sent.") Sega
Enter. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (direct liability of a com-
puter bulletin board operator who knew and encouraged infringing activities); Play-
boy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (contributory liability
for copyright infringement by a "passive" computer bulletin board operator); see
generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Computer Bulletin Board
Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & Err. L.J. 345 (1995).
17 Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
18 This extreme result has led some to argue that the White Paper's recommenda-
tions eliminate browsing and other currently legal uses of copies of works. See Lit-
man, supra note 11, at 31-32.
19 Posting Private Mail-Comments to Matt Elkin, Dec. 5, 1995, available at
cyberia-l@warthog.cc.wm.edu. A discussion of the default assumption for posts to a
computer discussion group can be found at Copyright Permissions Proposal, Dec.
21, 1995, available at cyberia-l@warthog.cc.wm.edu.
[Vol. 75, 19961
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infringing copies of a work does not mirror the reality of social
practices on the Internet, and may result in a drastic reduction in
the stock of publicly accessible symbols necessary for a healthy
creative environment.
20
Furthermore, given the low threshold of fixation endorsed by
the White Paper, whereby even the most transient digital works
are considered to be fixed, the question naturally arises as to
what version of a constantly evolving digitized work is "the"
work. The fixation principle ignores the ready morphing of digi-
tized information that so commonly occurs in networked envi-
ronments. Many works in a networked environment are
profoundly rather than marginally interactive.
21
B. The "Author" Principle
The models of authorship that frequently appear in the
networked environment are at odds with the idea of the solitary
genius. They are often, perhaps mostly, collaborative or interac-
tive. Although the trend toward interactive programming is in-
creasing, early stand-alone computer programs relied primarily
on a division between creator (author) and user (reader). 22 The
20 Sega Enterp. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
fair use in intermediate copy of computer program where "computer programs...
distributed for public use in object code form often precludes public access to the
ideas and functional concepts contained in those programs, and thus confers on the
copyright owner a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional concepts.");
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992);
see generally Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (argu-
ing that a large public domain is a prerequisite to innovation).
21 Networked computer environments do not necessarily differ in kind from
stand-alone computers or even other literary works in that regard, but they differ
vastly in amount of interactivity. The CONTU Report recognized that
many transactions involving copies of programs are entered into with full
awareness that users will modify their copies to suit their own needs, and
this should be reflected in the law. The comparison of this practice to ex-
tensive marginal note-taking in a book is appropriate: note-taking is argua-
bly the creation of a derivative work, but unless the note-taker tries to copy
and vend that work, the copyright owner is unlikely to be very concerned.
Should proprietors feel strongly that they do not want rightful possessors of
their copies of their programs to prepare such adaptations, they could, of
course, make such desires a contractual matter.
CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 13-14.
22 Software vendors have attempted to place restrictions on software through
shrink-wrap and other kinds of licenses, such as the rigid use licenses at issue in the
MAI trilogy of cases. See supra note 14; see also David A. Rice, Licensing the Use
of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30
JuRIMETmIcs J. 157 (1990). The reported fair use cases involving computer pro-
HeinOnline  -- 75 Or. L. Rev. 263 1996
OREGON LAW REVIEW
person who wrote the computer software could be easily analo-
gized to the "author" of a literary work. By contrast, in the digi-
tal world created by networked computers, each user of a work is
also easily transformed into a creator of that same work. In my
previous e-mail example, I can reply to the original message at
length, retaining some or all of the original message itself within
my reply. Many works available through networked computers
invite response or are otherwise designed to be interactive. This
attribute is one of the biggest advantages of using a networked
system of computers. In a networked environment, authorial
identity and intent are profoundly malleable and interactive.
Much recent theoretical work on the idea of authorship has
challenged the assumption underlying copyright law of a single
authorial genius.23 The creative process is complex and depends
on a multiplicity of different types of production, as well as on a
healthy stock of publicly accessible symbols.24 For example, the
concept of "recoding" brought into copyright theory by Rose-
mary Coombe 25 is a concept that makes the reader into an au-
thor and thus creates a powerful argument in favor of expanding
the public domain of information. In the recoding view of au-
thorship, "expression" is a process rather than a status, some-
thing that proliferates rather than is controlled.26 The production
of a "work" that is subject to protection by copyright is an activ-
ity undertaken by both author and audience. Authorial intent,
based as it is on a combination of the political construct of pos-
sessive liberal individualism and the social construct of the soli-
tary romantic genius, is rejected in favor of a more complex,
contradictory meaning-making process.
The post-structuralist term "intertext," introduced into copy-
gramming competitors demonstrate a reliance on the creator/user divide. See Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (1992), Sega Enter-
prises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (1992).
23 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. Pi-r. L. REv. 235 (1991);
Peter A. Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship",
1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects
of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1853 (1991); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellec-
tual Property and the Public Domain Part II, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191
(1994).
24 See generally supra note 20.
25 Coombe, supra note 23, at 1863-64 (definition of recoding).
26 As Vibeke Sorenson stated to me, "the original of a work is the experience of
that work by the audience." Vibeke Sorenson, Remarks at The Innovation and In-
formation Environment Conference (Nov. 1995).
[Vol. 75, 19961
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right theory by Richard Rotstein and Keith Aoki, denotes that
ambiguous space between author and audience where authorial
intent and audience interpretation intersect in a contrapuntal dy-
namic of coded and recoded meanings.27 The copyright concept
of "intertext," used to critique the notion of a user passively
reading a print-based work, applies with even more force to digi-
tal networked works that take place in what is commonly termed
"cyberspace."28 In the intertext, each author is both creator and
user; each work is deliberately created by a highly interactive
process. The reader (or user) in a digitized networked environ-
ment often in turn becomes an "author" even as to works that
are not intended to be collaborative.
The binary structure of copyright law, dependent as it is upon a
strict division between author and reader, or original artist and
copyist, is being corroded by networked digital information. The
implications of the collapse of this binary structure are too enor-
mous to be explored at length here. It is important to note, how-
ever, that the proliferation of copies in the age of digital
reproduction reverses the presumptive valence of "origi-
nal=good, copy=bad." Many examples of artistic and other sorts
of creation on the Internet depend heavily upon the free availa-
bility of copies.29
The fixed work and individual author principles, among others,
27 Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction
of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, (1993); Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext:
Authorship and Audience 'Recoding' Rights - Comment on Robert H. Rotstein,
"Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work", 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 805, 810 (1993) (linking intertextuality to recoding). Rotstein pointed
out that
much post-structuralist criticism ... emphasizes the inevitable interrela-
tionship-termed 'intertextuality'-among all texts. Post-structuralist
thought posits that intertextuality arises out of both the reading and the
writing process. Texts do not exist independently of someone reading
them, and the text is never a separate 'work,' but is always permeated by
other texts that the reader brings to the process of reading.
Rotstein, supra at 737.
28 "Cyberspace" is derived from William Gibson's cyberpunk novel. See WIL-
LIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 52-53 (1984). Alternative terms include: "infobahn"
(attributed to John Perry Barlow, Jackboots on the Infobahn, WIRED (Apr. 1994)),
"information superhighway," "metaverse," "datasphere," "the Web," "the Net."
See Timothy C. May, What's the opposite of cyberspace (Jan. 5, 1996) archived at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/listservs/cyber/. I use the term "intertext" to refer to the
process of textual or informational meaning-making that occurs in cyberspace.
29 Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values
in Intellectual Property, 68 Cmi.-KENT L. REv. 841, 842 (1993) (shifting focus of
moral justification in intellectual property law from authors to copiers).
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construct copyright law upon the assumptions of traditional
print-based technology, which is increasingly displaced if not
made utterly obsolete by digital-based technologies. They are
suspect even in this macro-examination. The following section
examines their application to one micro-example of collaborative
Internet work.
II
JOINT WORK PRINCIPLES AND COLLABORATIVE
INTERNET WORK
In this section, I examine an Internet-based visual art piece.3°
I first describe the piece and the creator's articulation of it. I
then examine how and why this work does not fit into the "joint
work" category, a primary doctrinal category through which
copyright law recognizes collaborative work. In examining a
frankly collaborationist type of visual digital art housed on an
Internet World Wide Web site, the very design and execution of
which depended on the deliberate changing by many authors of a
single author's original image, we may begin to realize the limits
of existing legal doctrines that are based on print-based works.
Furthermore, we can begin to imagine a copyright structure that
responds to practices in the networked digitized environments.
A. Is the Chain Art Project a "Joint Work"?
An artist, Bonnie Mitchell, recently solicited art students,
other artists, and anyone else on the Internet to engage in an
artistic project that deliberately reworked the boundaries of indi-
vidual and self.31 The Chain Art project was collaborative and
took place in a networked digital environment. Technically, each
visual image began when a University of Oregon art student
uploaded a digitized image onto an FTP32 site. The person "next
30 1 am not making the claim that this one piece represents all of the activity that
goes on in a digitized networked environment, or even all of different types of digi-
tized networked art.
31 Professor Bonnie Mitchell's first Internet art piece, Chain Art, is the subject of
this analysis. It can be reached at http//ziris.syr.edu. Housed on the same Web site
are examples of Professor Mitchell's more recent work, which is not analyzed here.
32 FTP is named after the application protocol it uses: the "File Transfer Pro-
tocol" (FrP). As the name implies, the protocol's job is to move files from
one computer to another. It doesn't matter where the two computers are
located, how they are connected, or even whether or not they use the same
operating system. Provided that both computers can "talk" the FTP proto-
[Vol. 75, 1996]
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in line" in that student's group (typically someone from another
state or country) downloaded that image, manipulated it, and
uploaded the changed image onto the FTP site. There were
twenty-three groups of images, and ultimately 136 participants
from ten countries. The final piece is flamboyantly collaborative:
each image is attributed to an author and all images are housed
together.
Despite the communality in creative effort, questions of indi-
vidual ownership and commercialization have arisen. Bonnie
Mitchell writes: "because I developed the project and coordi-
nated it, am I considered the primary author or editor? What if a
gallery wanted to display and sell the work? Who should get the
royalties? '33 Bonnie Mitchell asks how copyright law can honor
the artists' need to borrow from existing idioms and at the same
time accomodate their need to guard the integrity and uses of
their expression?
The Chain Art project is partially about letting go of artistic
control. As Bonnie Mitchell stated,
Interesting thing about this project is that while I was develop-
ing the concept, I envisioned the end product, the image that
was created by numerous individuals, as the most important
element. Before the project began, a few participants sug-
gested saving all the in-between images. Although I had
planned to save them for archival purposes, I did not realize at
the time that the progression, as the image passed from hand
to hand, would be much more interesting than the final image
alone. 34
In the end, however, Bonnie felt that "it is not possible to look at
the pieces as individual works totally separate from the rest of
the work. Because each piece built on to the existing piece, it is
easier to look at the series of images in the group as a single work
with multiple authors. '35
The spirit of collaboration infused this work from beginning to
end, but the particular form of collaboration changed in the mid-
col and have access to the Internet, you can use the FTP command to trans-
fer files.
ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG 59 (1992) (emphasis
in original).
33 Bonnie Mitchell, Creative Connections - International Networked Collabora-
tive Art, paper presented to the College Art Association 83rd Annual Conference
(Jan. 1995) (on file with author).
34 Id.
35 Id.
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die. Instead of defining the "work" as the final image in each
group, it was defined as all of the images together. (This vision
of the work, however, is articulated by the person who conceived
and oversaw the execution of the work rather than by all those
who participated in the work.)
The Chain Art project could be treated as a joint work, in
which case each artist would be one of the many artists who par-
ticipated, and each would be able to license the use of the work
subject only to a duty to account to the other authors.36 Despite
the intensely collaborative nature of the work, however, doctri-
nal rules may prevent it from being treated as such. "A 'joint
work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the inten-
tion that their contributions be merged into inseparable or inter-
dependent parts of a unitary whole. '3 7 The statutory definition
of "joint work" focuses on the intent of the authors that the
works be merged into a whole. In the absence of express acqui-
escence to Bonnie Mitchell's overall concept such as a contract,38
the intent question would probably be difficult to resolve without
in-depth discovery, including possible depositions of all 136 par-
ticipants. This will not only result in a plethora of different "in-
tents" but also, due to the advanced stage of the litigation
process, make "intent" expensive to determine.
Moreover, legislative history indicates that under the section
101 definition a work would not be "joint" unless its authors col-
laborated among themselves or unless all of the authors knew, at
the time the work was being written, that their contributions
would be integrated as "inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole. ' 39 Courts such as the Second Circuit have fo-
cused less on the "collaboration" part of this statement than on
the "knowledge at the time the work was being written" state-
ment that follows the conjunctive "or".40 That is, courts have
36 Alternatively, the work could be treated as a compilation, a work-for-hire, or a
derivative work. These possibilities are not explored here.
37 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
38 Of course, if there is an express agreement, then a party probably will not raise
a joint work defense.
39 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736. See generally Scott C. Brophy, Joint Authorship Under the
Copyright Law, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ErNr. L.J. 451 (1994); Nancy Perkins Spyke,
The Joint Work Dilemma: The Separately Copyrightable Contribution Requirement
and Co-Ownership Principles, 40 J. CoPYRiorr Soc'Y U.S.A. 463 (1993).
40 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505-07 (2d Cir. 1991) (requiring two-part
showing: (1) the contribution of each joint author must be copyrightable; and (2) the
[Vol. 75, 1996]
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construed intent narrowly to mean that all putative joint authors
must intend to make a joint work at the time of the creation of
that work. Here, Mitchell's vision of the work was not static.
Although she had an overall design, she did not determine in
advance what pieces would be included, who would be included
as other authors, and how the pieces would ultimately relate to
each other. Which version of her design is the merged "work":
the anticipated version where only the final image in each group
was displayed, or the final version where all images in each group
would be displayed? If her intent changed midway through the
execution of the piece, does that change the copyrightability of
the image groups created in the second half of the execution? Or
does her intent at the beginning of the collaborative process con-
trol, thus foreclosing protection of the whole group of images?
And what of the intent of her students and the other participants:
must they be similarly unwavering? Mitchell developed the con-
cept, but interested people immediately began to send her both
artistic and technical suggestions, which often wove their way
into the work. Moreover, if Mitchell herself had not contributed
an image to the piece, she may have found herself in the para-
doxical situation of having conceptualized the piece, but having
been excluded from authorship status.41
Although the White Paper expands the possible universe of
protection by recommending that transmission of transiently
fixed digital information be made a section 106 right, the Chain
Art Project shows that some categories of works - ironically the
ones that privilege collaborative effort - may not in fact be pro-
tected even by these expansive amendments.
parties must have intended to be joint authors such "that their contributions be
merged into a unitary whole"). See also Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d
1061, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1994); Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.
1989).
41 For those courts demanding independent copyrightability of each author's con-
tribution, a putative joint author such as Mitchell "must supply more than mere
direction or ideas. An author is 'the party who actually creates the work, that is, the
person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright
protection."' Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989)). This one-size-fits-all definition does not
allow courts to take into account the custom of each copyright industry in treatment
of authorship. See Brophy, supra note 39, at 488. For example, in the screen-writing
area, the "idea" person may not be considered typically the author of a work. How-
ever, in the conceptual or visual art area, the "idea" person is often the person who
is regarded as the primary author.
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B. Why "Joint Work" Does Not Work
As seen from this brief analysis, courts interpreting the doctri-
nal category of "joint work" have put a highly restrictive spin on
the collaborative process: only those collaborative efforts in
which all authors agree that the work is intended to be merged
into a whole are those that obtain joint work status. Print-based
copyright law does not recognize the fluidity of a "work" so com-
mon in networked computer environments, and illustrated by the
Chain Art Project's constant change in response to the shaping of
the work itself. Immediate reflexivity of a work is an important
attribute of a digitized networked environment, as well as the
post-modem information epoch. 2 Print-based copyright doc-
trine also fails to recognize that Internet-based works invite non-
linear and spontaneously temporal responses to works.4 3
The bad news about the joint work category is that it seems not
to recognize the morphability, flexibility and fluidity of
networked digitized works. The good news is that there is a fo-
cus on process-on the activity of creating a work, rather than on
the fixed end result of a work." This emphasis has the potential
to decenter the notion of fixation in typeset or even computer
memory as the ultimate definition of a work, and help center the
notion of fluidity that is so crucial to a networked environment.
For this insight, we need to turn again to the theoretical idea of
the "author" behind the work.
As the prior discussion indicates, where multiple authors of a
consciously collaborative work exist, we encounter legal interpre-
tations of "joint work" that are influenced by the cult of the Ro-
mantic author.4 5 Copyright law can only recognize a joint work if
42 See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 39 (1990) ("We
are abroad in a world which is thoroughly constituted through reflexively applied
knowledge, but where at the same time we can never be sure that any given element
of that knowledge will not be revised.").
43 See generally Katsh, supra note 15.
44 This is reminiscent of the Sega decision, in which the Ninth Circuit found fair
use in the intermediate copying of a computer video game program. Sega Enter-
prises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993). The court's inquiry fo-
cused less on the final product (the competing video game software) than on the
intermediate copying. Id. at 1518-19. The court was forced to consider the process
of producing a work, rather than the final work itself, in reaching its fair use deci-
sion. By shifting its perspective from end result to intermediate process, the Sega
court was able to discern reasons for keeping the computer code in the public do-
main. Id. at 1520-28.
45 See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 122-
24 (1993) (arguing that Shakespeare engaged in collaborationist cultural production,
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each individual author intends that his or her individual flame of
genius completely and unambiguously merge into an inseparable
or interdependent union with that of the other authors.46 In an
artistic production that foregrounds group capacities, characteris-
tics and potentials, group effort is flattened to fit into the Roman-
tic "author" model, in a maneuver that is antithetical to the
professed spirit of the organic vision of an artistic effort like the
Chain Art project. Alternatively, the "work" is deemed to be
that of an individual author, either through individual or compi-
lation copyright. While these are not necessarily evil alterna-
tives, they do not accurately reflect the creative process that went
into this work. It is not far-fetched to extrapolate from this ex-
ample to other collaborative works in networked digitized envi-
ronments. Whether the work is an e-mail conversation or a
serialized document, the individual-based notion of "work" does
not describe what is actually occurring in this new medium.
The theoretical concepts of "recoding" and the "intertext"
could begin to expand the doctrinal category of joint work to ac-
count for the ways in which collaborative work is actually au-
thored in networked computer environments. Perhaps the idea
of "recoding" can be implanted modestly in copyright law to de-
scribe a type of activity that takes place among several joint au-
thors. For example, what if "intent" of a putative joint author
were measured not by each author's conscious intent, but by the
existing expectations of subcultures within the Internet?47 Here,
but that his image was refashioned as the quintessential Romantic genius); Rose-
mary J. Coombe, Challenging Paternity: Histories of Copyright, 6 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 397 (Summer 1994) (reviewing RosE, supra; MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE
AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS
(1994); DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT (1992)); James D.A.
Boyle, The Search for An Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV.
625 (1988) (arguing that Shakespeare illustrates the indefinite contours of "author-
ship"); Jaszi, supra note 23, at 468 (arguing that lobbying around the Statute of
Anne and subsequent copyright statutes required the invention of an "author").
46 This focus partially accounts for the failure of the Second Circuit in both Chil-
dress and Weissmann to recognize a "joint work." See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d
500 (2d Cir. 1991); Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989). The sole
author is the one who gets the legal presumption of validity, to be rebutted by con-
trary evidence.
47 It is hard nowadays to conceptualize a distinct Internet culture, but certainly it
is (or at least was) characterized in part by a public domain rather than proprietary
ethic. This is exemplified by, among other things, John Perry Barlow's slogan "infor-
mation wants to be free," Richard Stallman's shareware ethic, and Eric Hughes'
cypherpunk spirit. John Perry Barlow, Richard Stallman & Eric Hughes, Remarks
at The Innovation and the Information Environment Conference (Nov. 1995). In
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why not infer intent from the fact that the individual author vol-
untarily created his or her work in response to a call for partici-
pation that emphasized interactivity? If an individual would-be
author's sense of self is violated by this construction, then he or
she can simply choose not to participate in the construction of
this kind of "work." If such intent is inferred in an environment
that everyone knows is profoundly interactive, then joint works
could also include other two or multi-way communications that
occur regularly on the Internet, such as e-mail postings to discus-
sion groups (particularly where the ground rules for participation
include an explicit policy of interactivity). Again, this would en-
courage and even naturalize the flexibility that is a distinctive
feature of networked communications environments.
III
NEW COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP ON THE INTERNET
One major "policy" principle behind the CONTU Report was
to create incentives for the development of computer programs.
That principle is based on a fear of ease of reproducibility: digi-
tized works are easy to reproduce, and such reproduction is hard
to detect.48 Thus creators of computer programs may lack incen-
tive to write programs. According to the CONTU Report, that
incentive comes in the form of copyright protection.49
The ghost that haunts the White Paper seems to be the same
fear that animated the CONTU Report: without copyright as an
incentive, no works will be produced because those that are pro-
duced could easily be reproduced. 5° However, many of those
other words, the cultural norm on the Internet is to maximize freedom of expression
through a narrow construction of proprietary rights, and from that norm an intent to
create a joint work can be inferred. In other areas of the law, intent is often mea-
sured by something other than Vulcan mind-meld of possessive liberal individualists.
For example, the intent in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can
be inferred from recklessness.
48 For example,
the following proposition seems sound: if the cost of duplicating informa-
tion is small, then it is simple for a less than scrupulous person to duplicate
it. This means that legal as well as physical protection for the information
is a necessary incentive if such information is to be created and
disseminated.
CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 10.
49 Id. at 11.
50 See White Paper, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that "[a]uthors are wary of enter-
ing this market because doing so exposes their works to a higher risk of piracy and
[Vol. 75, 19961
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positioned in the digital world51 as well as the legal world52 ques-
tion that assumption. Among the digerati5 3 Esther Dyson argues
that content itself should not be protected by copyright law; In-
ternet providers presumably would recoup their investment
through services such as support, customization, search engines
or other content free activities.54 John Perry Barlow and Richard
Stallman made similar arguments at The Innovation and Infor-
mation Environment Conference.
The incentive principle upon which the CONTU Report and
the White Paper is based does not work easily in a digitized
world where much of the "value" of information comes from the
flexible uses to which it can be put. Moreover, this principle
seems to be undermined empirically by the proliferation of new
works already available on networked computers.5 5 No incen-
tive, at least in the form of formal copyright protection, seems to
be necessary for many authors who already "publish" on the In-
ternet. In a networked computer environment, many creators of
works are not highly capitalized, do not expect to receive protec-
tion for their works, and even expect and welcome changes and
interactive suggestions made by others. In many significant ways,
the Internet has flourished in the absence of copyright
protection.
5 6
other unauthorized uses than any of the traditional, current modes of
dissemination").
51 Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136; John Perry Barlow,
The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the
Digital Age (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property is Wrong), WIRED,
Mar. 1994, at 84.
52 Samuelson, supra note 2; Litman, supra note 11.
53 "Digerati," a play on "literati," is described in Paul Keegan, The Digerati!, THE
NEW YoRK TimEs MAGAZINE, May 21, 1995, at 38.
54 As Esther Dyson comments:
So, what happens in a world where software is basically free? Successful
companies are adopting business models in which they are rewarded for
services rather than for code. Developers who create software are re-
warded for showing users how to use it, for installing systems, for develop-
ing customer-specific applications. The real value created by most software
companies lies in their distribution networks, trained user bases, and brand
names-not in their code.
Dyson, supra note 51, at 141. See also David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological
Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy,
15 RESEARCH POLICY 285 (1986) (arguing that "complementary assets" such as dis-
tribution and service mechanisms are necessary for innovators to benefit from newly
developed product protected by law).
55 Alfred C. Yen, Home Pages, 75 OR. L. REv. 331 (1996).
56 Moreover, the West page-numbering debate illustrates the danger of overex-
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However, even in intensely collaborative environments, indi-
vidual feelings of ownership (or perhaps possessiveness) emerge.
An incentive question, for example, precipitated my examination
of the protectability of the Chain Art project. It was one based
on an artist's urge to "commercialize" the work by licensing it to
an art gallery.57 Another artist, Vibeke Sorenson, expressed re-
lated concerns of attribution and integrity when she wrote that
the public nature of Internet art "does not mean that advertising
agencies, for example, should be able to take that work and ex-
ploit it without permission and proper credit. '58 Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, artists themselves (even some who are flamboyantly
appropriationist or who engage in deliberately collaborative
work) retain some core notion of artistic integrity that is tied to a
"self," albeit a slightly modified Romantic definition of self.59
tending copyright protection to digitized works where a market exists for different
digital versions of the same content. Gary Wolf, Who Owns the Law?, WIRED, May
1994, at 98; James Love, Note on West Copyright of Page Numbers of Published
Judicial Decisions, TAP-INFO Internet Distribution List, Nov. 1, 1993, available in
CNI-copyright mailing list.
57 The existence of the Chain Art project does not necessarily refute this concern,
as Bonnie Mitchell is an academic and thus does not need incentive purely through
commercialization of her works.
58 Vibeke Sorenson, Thoughts of a Computer Artist, 75 OR. L. REV. 309 (1996).
Sorenson recognizes the impulse toward public access, however, stating that "[s]ome
artists feel that the Internet is a public space and that art on the network should be
considered public art .... In this electronic town square environment, I would have
a dilemma in asking people to pay for my art, especially if they are just looking."
Id. at 315. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Exploiting the Artist's Commercial Identity:
The Merchandizing of Art Images, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (fall 1994/winter
1995).
J.S.G. Boggs remarks:
If another artist drew on top of a print of my drawing, ... I could accept
that as a creative act. The original would remain, after all, unaltered.
This is difficult for me. I might not like ... the additional drawing, but I
could accept the addition as valid where my creative contribution was sig-
nificant under three conditions:
1. My original work must be acknowledged.
2. The new work must be properly identified as an additive work.
3. I must receive my fair share of the proceeds.
J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 CHI.-KErr L. REV. 889, 892 (1993) (emphasis in
original).
59 For example, Bonnie Mitchell states,
It was very interesting to watch the students [sic] reactions as they received
the new images each week. They felt very attached to the image that the
[sic] had started and were very upset when someone changed the image in
a way they were unhappy with .... They often referred to the image as
belonging to them, but did it really?
Mitchell, supra note 33. Moreover, even in the absence of a commercial incentive,
[Vol. 75, 19961
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Whatever the futurologists predict, the Internet has not yet
erased the vestiges of earlier historical views of authorship and
works-views reinforced by cultural practices that persist despite
successive waves of different kinds of "mechanical reproduc-
tion," appropriation art, post-structuralist theory and critical
thinking in the law. Moreover, even a view of information that
privileges individual right of access over individual proprietary
rights must address the interests in attribution and integrity that
relate to accuracy if not ownership of information.6 °
How would an expanded "joint work" category affect incentive
to create? To the extent that one believes in a rough positive
correlation between copyright and innovation, the more joint
works, the better. Because of the tenancy in common shared by
joint authors, any one of them could license the use of the work
(provided that the license was non-exclusive), subject only to a
duty to account. The effect would be to encourage rather than
discourage the broad dissemination of the work: the more au-
thors, the more opportunities and potential for use and licensing
of the joint work. Assuming that copyright protection enhances
incentive to create works by enhancing the commercialization
potential of a work, the recognition of a joint work category
would further that end.
Broad dissemination by several joint authors of "privately"
owned works might ironically simultaneously enhance access to
any particular work. In fact, the "joint work" category is often
raised as a defense to a claim of copyright infringement, in an
attempt by the defendant to defeat the exclusive control of a
work by a single author. The "joint work" defense, like the fair
use defense, shows how individual rights can themselves be used
as tactics against the tendency to centralize and control informa-
tion that inevitably accompanies an increase in proprietary
rights. This would increase the domain of accessible works es-
sential to the progress project underlying the patent and copy-
there might be a moral-rights basis for ensuring the inviolability of a work through
copyright. The articulation of an inviolable artistic self is perhaps rooted in modern-
ist impulses that are outdated in the context of the networked communications and
the reality of any particular collaborative digitized work. It certainly seems at odds
with the basic premises of the Chain Art project. Despite the seeming contradiction,
however, I simply want to note and honor it for purposes of this paper.
60 See Mark Lemley, Rights of Attribution and Integrity in Online Communica-
tions, 1995 J. Ot'nE L. art. 2.
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right clause of the Constitution.61
CONCLUSION
It is probably true, as one Conference participant noted pri-
vately, that the term "new wine in old bottles" is a hackneyed
metaphor among the legal digerati by now. Yet it is still useful.
This paper begins to explore how the new wine of digital
networked information spills out of the old bottle of the 1976
Copyright Act.
Of course, reality always spills out of the categories we impose
upon it. Awkwardness of a doctrinal fit, in and of itself, is not
enough to create new principles to animate existing caselaw. The
most pertinent question that I have attempted to answer here is
whether the print-based copyright principles unduly distort the
creative process in networked computer environments. My brief
examination of one Internet art project and one doctrinal copy-
right category yields a tentative answer of "yes." In order to ac-
comodate and indeed capitalize on the flexibility and flux
inherent in the medium of networked computer environments,
copyright principles should more accurately reflect actual prac-
tice of creation in these environments.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress":
Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. Rav. 97, 102-03
(1993) (arguing for the existence of a constitutional right of access to information).
[Vol. 75, 19961
HeinOnline  -- 75 Or. L. Rev. 276 1996
